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ABSTRACT

This paper estimates the nexus of inter-relationships between public and private
external debts accumulation, capital accumulation and production within a simultaneous
equation system using panel data for the period 1970-1988 from highly indebted
developing countries clustered into three distinct regions: Latin-America, Asia-Pacific and
Sub-Saharan Africa. The estimation results indicate that the full effects of the public and
private external debts on GNP are small and of an opposite sign, whereas an increase in the
GNP level raises substantially the public and private external debts. These findings support
Bulow-Rogoff’s proposition that the external debts of developing countries are not a
primary cause of economic slowdown.

*

Amnon Levy is an Associate Professor and Khorshed Chowdhury is a lecturer at the Department of
Economics, University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia. The authors are indebted to Mei
Ball for dedicated research assistance.

1

1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The ‘Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt’, which is

published in the Winter 1990 issue of the Journal o f Economic Perspectives, reveals a
major controversy between two schools of thought about the effects of the external debt on
economic growth and the role of international facilities for debt relief. The first school of
thought, represented by Kenen (1990) and Sachs (1990), claims that the external debt
overhang is a primary cause of economic slowdown in the highly indebted countries and
hence there is an urgent need for an international debt relief facility. In contrast, the second
school of thought, represented by Bulow and Rogoff (1990), claims that the external debts
of developing countries are not the cause of economic slowdown, but rather a symptom of
poor economic management and economic growth. This school also argues that the
presence of official creditors, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, ossifies the negotiating position of the private creditors and leads to a ‘free-rider’
problem whereby indebted countries are likely to use the rescheduling negotiated for other
indebted countries as a benchmark for obtaining better arrangements. Thus, the commercial
banks are likely to take a tougher attitude toward countries which negotiate the rescheduling
of their debts earlier.
In a previous study, we conducted Granger causality tests for twenty-nine highly
indebted developing countries in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Southern Europe and the Mediterranean and concluded that none of the aforementioned
general propositions about the causal relationships between economic growth and external
debt is valid (Levy, Chowdhury and Wilson, 1991). The Granger tests and the
computations of the long-term effects of the GNP growth rate on the external debt
accumulation rate indicated that Bulow-Rogoff’s proposition that the level of external debt
of the developing countries is just a symptom of economic slowdown is rejected for all the
countries included in the study. The Kenen-Sachs’ proposition that external debt leads to an
economic slowdown was supported for only fifty per cent of investigated countries in
Latin-America and for Sudan. Among these countries, the long-term effect of the external
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debt accumulation rate on the GNP growth rate was found to be substantially large only in
the cases of Brazil, Jamaica, Venezuela and Sudan. The results for thirteen countries out of
the twenty-nine indicated the existence of a feedback (bi-directional) relationship between
the GNP growth rate and the external debt accumulation rate.
In order to supplement the study of the cause and effect relationships between GNP
and external debt with more structural economic analysis, the present paper assesses the
direct, indirect and full effects of the external debt on GNP, and vice versa, by estimating a
system of simultaneous equations which displays the possible interactions between GNP,
capital stock accumulation, public and publicly guaranteed external debt and private external
debt accumulation. The simultaneous equation system also incorporates the effects of
exogeneous and lagged-dependent variables on the aforementioned endogeneous variables.
It is estimated with panel data for the period 1970-1988 on thirty-six highly indebted
developing countries clustered into three distinct regions: Latin-America, Asia-Pacific and
Sub-Saharan Africa.
With regard to the above-mentioned controversy, the estimates of the simultaneous
equation system indicate that the full (direct and indirect) effect of GNP on public and
private external debts is positive: an increase of 1 per cent in the GNP level is expected to
raise the public and publicly guaranteed external debt level by 0.469, 0.415 and 1.450 per
cent and the private external debt level by 0.293, 0.072 and 0.269 per cent in the cases of
Latin-America, Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. In contrast to Kenen
and Sachs’ assertion, it is found that the effects of the public and private external debts on
the GNP level in these regions is small: a 1 per cent rise in the public and the publicly
guaranteed external debt level is likely to increase the GNP level by 0.158, 0.240 and
0.358 per cent in the cases of Latin-America, Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa,
respectively; whereas a rise of
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per cent in the private external debt is expected to reduce

the GNP level by 0.129, 0.033 and 0.016 per cent in the cases of Latin America, AsiaPacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. These magnitudes and the directions of the
estimated elasticities lend support to the first half of Bulow-Rogoff s claim that the external
debts of the developing countries are not a primary cause of economic slowdown. They
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indicate that an economic slowdown (that is, a decrease in the GNP level) is accompanied
by lower external liabilities on behalf of the developing countries.
The other findings of the paper are as follows. The GNP has a positive direct effect
on the stock of capital in Latin America, Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover,
the effect of GNP on capital stock is indirectly amplified by the positive effect of the public
external debt on capital stock in these regions; but, excluding the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, it is indirectly moderated by the negative effect of the private external debt on capital
stock. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the positive effect of the private external debt on
capital stock reinforces the positive effect of GNP on capital accumulation. In all of the
three regions, the full effect of GNP on capital accumulation is positive.
In general, Sub-Saharan African countries enjoyed better terms for repaying their
public and publicly guaranteed external debt than the Asian-Pacific and Latin American
countries; and the Asia-Pacific countries enjoyed better debt repayment terms than the Latin
American countries. However, this order is reversed in the case of the private external debt:
the toughest repayment terms have been imposed on Sub-Saharan African countries,
whereas the Asia-Pacific countries enjoyed a significant degree of forgiveness and/or
negative real interest rate, and the Latin American countries enjoyed the most substantial
private external debt relief.
It is found that the greater the percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture,
the lower the GNP level, the greater the accumulation of capital stock, the smaller the
accumulation of public and publicly guaranteed external debt, and the smaller the
accumulation of private external debt. In all of the three investigated regions, a negative
association is found between the public and the publicly guaranteed external debt and the
terms of trade. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, also the private external debt decreases
with the terms of trade. However, the private external debt increases with the terms of trade
in the case of Asia-Pacific. The ineffectiveness of the terms of trade in reducing the private
external debt is also evident in the case of Latin America.
Finally, a negative, but statistically insignificant, association between the public
external debt and the income share accruing to the bottom 40 per cent of the households is
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found in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in the cases of Asia-Pacific and Latin
America a positive (though insignificant in the case of Latin America) association is found.
The statistically insignificant association between the public external debt and income
inequality in Latin America might be explained by the severity of income inequality in this
region and hence the insufficiency of small changes in income inequality levels to alter the
problematic social and political situation which hampers the commitment of governments in
this region to deal effectively with their external debt problem. In contrast, in the AsiaPacific region, where income is substantially more equally distributed and populist policy is
less dominant, it is evident that an improvement in the public external debt problem occurs
at the expense of equality in the distribution of income.
The underlying conceptual framework and estimation procedure leading to the above
findings and conclusions are given in the following sections. The simultaneous equation
system of GNP, capital accumulation, and public and private external debt accumulation is
presented in section 2. The estimation method, data sources and estimation results are
described in section 3. The estimation results are discussed and interpreted in section 4.

2

SIMULTANEOUS EQUATION SYSTEM OF OUTPUT, CAPITAL
AND EXTERNAL DEBT ACCUMULATION
The GNP level can affect the country’s level of external borrowing by increasing

imports and consequently the current account deficit. Moreover, by recalling the common
practice of using the external debt-GNP ratio as a measure of the external debt burden, the
larger the GNP, ceteris paribus, the lower the external debt burden, and consequently, the
smaller the country’s financial leverage. Thus, a larger GNP can enhance the availability of
external credit and at a lower cost. While the above-mentioned factors tend to increase the
country’s external liabilities, a larger level of GNP, ceteris paribus, can reduce a country’s
reliance on external sources for satisfying the domestic demand for consumer goods and
financing investment in capital stock. Thus, the combined (or full) effect of GNP on the
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country’s external debt can be positive, zero, or negative if the former factors overweigh,
equal, or are overweighed by the latter.
In turn, one can also expect a reciprocal relationship as the country’s level of
indebtedness might affect the GNP level in the following ways. First, the higher the level
of indebtedness, and in particular that of the business sector, ceteris paribus, the larger the
country’s leverage, the more limited the external sources of credit, and the greater the
number of incidences of financial distress and liquidation adversely affecting the GNP level
directly and indirectly through discouraging domestic investment. Second, as argued by
Krugman (1989), an increase in the public and publicly guaranteed external debt might
indirectly depress the level of GNP by discouraging capital formation and encouraging
capital flight due to tax increase expectations. However, if a significant portion of external
borrowing is directed toward financing efficient investments in productive capital, a
positive correlation between the country’s GNP level and its external debt can be
anticipated.
These relationships are summarised in a system of simultaneous equations of
aggregate production, external debt accumulation, and capital accumulation. The proposed
system distinguishes between public and publicly guaranteed external debt (EDPUB) and
private external debt (EDPRIV), and thus comprises four equations. The system includes
state-transition variables— the lags of capital stock, public external debt and private external
debts (LCAPITAL, LEDPUB and LEDPRTV)—in order to incorporate the effects of capital
depreciation and debt-servicing costs on the accumulation of capital stock (CAPITAL) and
the external debt, respectively.
The system also includes some socioeconomic factors, such as the total labour force
participating in production (LABOR), the percentage of the country’s labour force in
agriculture (PLFAG), population (POP) and a measure of income inequality—the income
share accruing to the bottom 40 per cent of households (INSH40). Our attempt to
incorporate into the analysis additional socioeconomic factors, such as the labour-force
school years completed and poverty levels, have failed due to the unavailability of data for
many countries for a substantial number of years.
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The LABOR and PLFAG are introduced in the aggregate production equation. While
LABOR is considered to have an effect on the GNP as a production input, the PLFAG is
taken as an indicator of the level of modernisation of the production process. It is expected
that the higher the percentage of the labour force in agriculture the lower the aggregate
product. PLFAG is also introduced in the accumulation equations of capital and public and
private external debts as an indicator of the industrial structure of the economy. Thus,
PLFAG might also have an indirect effect on GNP through its effect on CAPITAL,
EDPUB and EDPRIV.
The socioeconomic variables POP and INSH40 are introduced in the capital
accumulation equation as indicators of the income distribution which in addition to the
GNP can affect the domestic level of savings. It is hypothesised that, all other things
remaining the same, the larger the population the lower the rate of savings and the smaller
the capital accumulation. In contrast, the effect of INSH40 on capital accumulation is not
clear, a priori. On the one hand, a higher level of income inequality (that is, smaller value
of INSH40) can lead to a higher propensity to save and subsequently to a higher level of
savings and investment. On the other hand, social and political dissatisfaction and unrest
stemming from a substantial degree of income inequality might adversely affect domestic
investment and also lead to a capital flight. Furthermore, social and political dissatisfaction
and unrest reduces the government’s ability and commitment to implement unpopular fiscal
measures such as subsidy and wage cuts and the restrictive monetary policies necessary for
alleviating the external debt problem. In view of this, INSH40 is also introduced in the
public and the publicly guaranteed external debt accumulation equation.
The external debt accumulation equations also incorporate the effects of changes in
the country’s terms of trade (TOT). It is expected that an increase in TOT reduces the
country’s external liabilities. Finally, the aggregate production equation includes the
squares of capital and labour (CAPITALSQ and LABORSQ, respectively) in order to
assess the properties of the marginal products of these production inputs.
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The simultaneous equation system comprises the following linear equations:

The aggregate production (or GNP) function

GNPit = ao + aiEDPUBit + a2EDPRIVit + a3CAPITALit + a^CAPITALSQit
+ asL A B O R it + a6L A B O R SQ it + ayPLFAG it + £iit-

(1)

The capital accumulation equation
CAPITAL* = b0 + biGNPit + b2 EDPUBit + b 3 EDPRIVit + b4 LCAPITALit
(2 )

+ b 5 PLFAGit + b6 POPit + b7INSH40it + e2 it.
The public and publicly guaranteed external debt accumulation equation

EDPUBjt = c0 + ci GNPit + c2LEDPUBit + c3PLFAG + c4TOTit
+ C5lNSH40it + E3it.

(3)

The private external debt accumulation equation
EDPRIVu = do + diGNPit + d2LEDPRIVit + d3PLFAGit + d4 TOTit + e4it. (4)

Here, i and t are country and year indices, respectively; and ei, e2, e3) and

£4

are random

disturbances having zero mean and finite variances and covariances.

3

DATA, ESTIMATION METHOD AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
The simultaneous equation system described above satisfied the order and the rank

conditions for identification. It is estimated with annual observations for the period 19701988 on thirty-six countries clustered into three distinct regions: Latin America, AsiaPacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Latin American group comprises eighteen countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
and Uruguay. The Asia-Pacific group includes ten countries: Bangladesh, Fiji, India,
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Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. The
Sub-Saharan African group includes eight countries: Cote D ’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zaire. The underlying rationale for clustering the
countries into regional groups is as follows. On the one hand, the short time series does not
enable a separate estimation of the simultaneous equation system for each country. On the
other hand, pooling the countries might lead to meaningless estimation results as substantial
structural differences among them are not captured by the included country-specific
variables. Since greater geographical affinity may facilitate transfer of both positive and
negative externalities between countries, clustering the countries into regional groups can
be viewed as a reasonable compromise ensuring a higher likelihood that the observations
considered in the econometric analysis are generated by a relatively similar process (Levy,
1992).
The simultaneous equation system is estimated by applying three-stage least squares
(3SLS) estimation procedure to pooled annual observations on countries affiliated with the
same geographical region. The nominal variables GNP, EDPUB and EDPRIV are extracted
from the World Tables, 1989-90 Edition, and from the World Debt Tables 1990-91. They
are deflated by the US GNP deflator, and expressed in millions of 1980 US dollars.
Correspondingly, the terms of trade index (TOT) is taken with 1980 as the base year (that
is, 1980=100) and as reported in the World Tables 1989-90. The capital stock is also taken
in millions of 1980 US dollars. Since this variable is not observed, it was approximated by
using the gross domestic investment figures obtained from the World Tables 1989-90 and
constant annual depreciation rate (0.1) as explained in the Appendix. Our sensitivity
analyses reveal that the estimation results do not change dramatically when the depreciation
rate is allowed to vary between 0.05 and 0.20. The population figures are also obtained
from the World Tables 1989-90 and presented in millions. The rest of the variables,
including LABOR, PLFAG and INSH40, are extracted from the Social Indicators o f
Development 1990. LABOR is taken as the product of the total labour force and the overall
participation rate, and is presented in millions. PLFAG and INSH40 are presented as
percentages.
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The estimation results of the simultaneous equation system are summarised by region
in Tables 1,2 and 3 for Latin America, Asia Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.
Table 1:

3SLS Estimation Results for Latin-America*
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Explanatory
Variables

GNP

CAPITAL

EDPUB

EDPRIV

2.0084
(10.302)

0.1214
(14.824)

0.0216
(7.4589)

E ndogenous
GNP
CAPITAL

0.7360
(11.6950)

EDPUB

-1.2378
(6.8979)

2.5063
(12.419)

EDPRIV

1.5378
(3.4459)

-4.4637
(3.8420)

Predetermined
LEDPUB

0.5539
(18.441)
0.7035
(18.368)

LEDPRIV
LCAPITAL

0.0167
(1.1538)

LABOUR

341.86
(0.2662)

CAPITALSQ

-5.0E-07
(2.5993)

LABORSQ

141.690
(2.0748)

PLFAG

-36.733
(0.6188)

254.60
(2.1152)

TOT

-48.680
(2.0577)

-2.9730
(0.5771)

-71.354
(7.3833)

0.3478
(0.1689)

POP

-914.67
(4.1129)

INSH40

162.89
(1.1382)

79.930
(0.8523)

-10754.0
(2.0596)

8101.1
(4.3728)

CONSTANT

957.90
(0.3804)

* The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.

63.044
(0.2013)
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Table 2:

3SLS Estimation Results for Asia-Pacific*
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Explanatory
Variables

GNP

CAPITAL

EDPUB

EDPRIV

0.0934
(11.337)

0.0021
(2.4975)

E ndogenous
3.1169
(6.2610)

GNP
CAPITAL

0.2843
(3.7229)

EDPUB

0.5631
(2.6877)

1.7683
(2.4012)

EDPRIV

3.2594
(3.3068)

-15.3880
(2.3682)

Predetermined
0.4868
(11.503)

LEDPUB

0.8509
(29.858)

LEDPRIV
0.0666
(1.2640)

LCAPITAL
LABOR

376.99
(1.0745)

CAPITALSQ

-2.0E-07
(1.1691)

LABORSQ

3.449
(1.1956)

PLFAG

-18.593
(0.1736)

575.22
(1.7242)

TOT

-86.805
(4.4611)

-8.1243
(2.6694)

-18.092
(2.1666)

2.4253
(1.9263)

POP

-358.61
(3.1891)

INSH40

-1316.30
(1.2954)

318.800
(4.0055)

-18298.0
(1.2074)

2594.9
(1.8580)

CONSTANT

2506.60
(0.4026)

* The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.

809.690
(4.0133)
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Table 3:

3SLS Estimation Results for Sub-Saharan Africa*
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Explanatory
Variables

GNP

CAPITAL

EDPUB

EDPRIV

0.7081
(9.1134)

0.0152
(2.0527)

Endogenous
GNP

2.0988
(5.5768)

CAPITAL

0.5367
(1.1383)

EDPUB

0.2774
(1.6489)

0.8488
(1.7509)

EDPRIV

-1.1606
(2.8061)

1.6235
(2.0683)

Predetermined
LEDPUB

0.1820
(4.2212)

LEDPRIV

1.0733
(42.906)

LCAPITAL

0.0466
(1.8074)

LABOR

1970.10
(6.0952)

CAPITALSQ

-2.0E-05
(0.7865)

LABORSQ

-220.550
(4.3492)

PLFAG

-196.940
(3.8539)

468.25
(3.8132)

TOT

-25.905
(1.4070)

-3.1608
(1.7688)

-20.586
(4.2421)

-0.8684
(1.8442)

POP

-441.26
(3.7055)

ISNH40

-398.57
(4.0788)

-10.850
(0.3209)

-28881.0
(2.7487)

2611.4
(1.7175)

CONSTANT

13649.00
(2.7586)

* The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.

267.360
(1.7704)
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4

INTERPRETATION OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS AND
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical findings indicated by Tables 1-3 are as follows.

The effect o f GNP on the public and private external debts
In the cases of Latin America, Asia Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, the GNP raises
both the public and private external debts. An increase of 1 per cent in the GNP is likely to
increase the public and publicly guaranteed external debt by 0.469, 0.415 and 1.450 per
cent and the private external debt by 0.293, 0.072 and 0.269 per cent in the cases of Latin
America, Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively.

The effect o f the public external debt on GNP
In the case of Latin America, the direct effect of the public and publicly guaranteed
external debt on GNP is negative. Note, however, that in contrast to Krugman’s capital
flight argument, the indirect effect of the public and publicly guaranteed external debt on
GNP through increasing the capital stock is positive and larger in absolute terms than the
direct effect. Thus, in the case of Latin America, the full effect of the public external debt
on GNP is positive but small: an increase of 1 per cent in the public external debt is likely
to increase the GNP by 0.158 percent. Note, further, that the positive estimates of the
indirect effects of the public external debt on GNP obtained in the cases of Asia-Pacific and
Sub-Saharan Africa also indicate that the capital flight generated by tax increase
expectations is smaller than the contribution of the public external borrowing in financing
investments in capital stock. Moreover, in these cases the direct effects, and hence the full
effects, of the public external debt on GNP are positive and substantially larger than in the
Latin American case: an increase of 1 per cent in the public external debt is likely to directly
and indirectly raise the GNP level by 0.240 per cent in the case of Asia-Pacific and by
0.358 per cent in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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The effect o f the private external debt on the GNP
In the cases of Latin America and Asia Pacific, the direct effect of the private external
debt on GNP is positive. However, in both cases the adverse indirect effects of the private
external debt on GNP through lowering private investment and the overall level of capital
stock are large in absolute value and substantially exceed the direct effects. Thus, the full
effects of the private external debt on GNP are negative: an increase of 1 per cent in the
private external debt is likely to reduce the GNP level by 0.129 per cent in the case of Latin
America and by 0.033 per cent in the case of Asia Pacific. In the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, the direct effect of the private external debt on GNP is negative, whereas the
indirect effect is positive. In this case, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect and
hence the full effect of private external debt on GNP is also negative: an increase of 1 per
cent in the private external debt is likely to reduce the GNP level by 0.016 percent.

The effect o f GNP and public and private external debt on capital stock
The GNP has a positive direct effect on the stock of capital in Latin America, AsiaPacific and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, in recalling the aforementioned positive effects
of GNP on the public and private external debts, the effect of GNP on capital stock is
indirectly amplified by the positive effect of the public external debt on capital stock in all of
the three regions; but, excluding the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is indirectly moderated
by the negative effect of the private external debt on capital stock. In the case of SubSaharan Africa, the positive effect of the private external debt on capital stock reinforces the
positive effect of GNP on capital accumulation. In all of the three regions, the full effect of
GNP on capital accumulation is positive and exceeds the direct effect.

The effect o f capital on GNP
The marginal product of capital is significantly positive in the cases of Latin America
and Asia-Pacific: an increase of 1 per cent in the capital stock is likely to raise the GNP
level by 1.289 per cent in the case of Latin America and by 0.539 in the case of AsiaPacific. The estimates associated with CAPITALSQ indicate further that these marginal
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products are diminishing. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the marginal product of
capital is positive but statistically insignificant. Also in this case, the marginal product of
capital is found to be diminishing.

The effect o f labour on GNP
Only in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa was the marginal product of labour found to
be significantly positive: an increase of

1

per cent in the labour force participating in

production is likely to increase the GNP level by 0.941 per cent. In this case, the estimate
associated with LABSQ indicates further that the marginal product of labour is diminishing.
In the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific, the marginal product of labour is positive
but statistically insignificant.

The effects o f the lags o f the public and private external debts
The motion equations of the public and the private external debts are expected to have
positive state-transition parameters (C2 and d 2 ) which are equal to one plus the
accumulation rate of the public or the private external debt, respectively. The accumulation
rates indicate the difference between the average real interest rate actually charged and the
share of the forgiven debt. The estimates of these state-transition parameters are
significantly positive in all cases, but, excluding the case of the private external debt of
Sub-Saharan Africa, smaller than one. Thus, they indicate that, in all of the three regions,
the shares of public and private external debts forgiven exceed the real interest rates actually
charged on these debts, and/or that the contracted real interest rates are negative. In the case
of the public external debt, the estimated coefficients reveal that in general Sub-Saharan
African countries enjoyed better debt repayment arrangements than the Asian-Pacific and
Latin American countries, and that the Asia-Pacific countries enjoyed better debt repayment
terms than the Latin American countries. This result might reveal the more forgiving
attitude of the official creditors toward the lower income countries. It is interesting to note
that in all cases the estimates of the state-transition parameters of the private external debt
are substantially greater than those of the public debts and indicate, perhaps, the stricter
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repayment terms of credit extended to private firms. This finding can be explained by the
following arguments:
i.

the private sector is significantly more indebted to commercial banks than the
public sector,

ii.

unlike the private external debt, the public external debt is a sovereign debt which
can be repudiated and hence the negotiating power of government is greater than
that of the private debtors, and

iii. debt discounts stem in part from altruism mixed with an awareness of equity
considerations, and hence it is more likely that debt discounts would be directed
toward relieving the public external debt burden.
The estimation results indicate that the toughest conditions on private external debt
repayments have been imposed on Sub-Saharan African countries where the average real
interest rate actually charged is about 7.33 per cent per annum. The Asia-Pacific countries
enjoyed a significant degree of forgiveness and/or negative real interest rate (about 0.15 per
cent) and the Latin American countries enjoyed a more substantial private external debt
relief (about 30 per cent).

The effect o f the lag o f capital stock
The state-transition parameter of the capital-stock’s motion equation (b4 ) is inversely
related to the annual depreciation rate of capital. Thus, the estimated low values of these
parameters can be seen as indicators of very high rates of capital depreciation in all three
regions.

The effect o f the industrial structure on GNP, capital stock and public and private external
debts accumulation
The fact that the directions (that is, signs) of the estimates associated with the
industrial structure variable PLFAG are identical for the three investigated regions indicates
the universality of the direct effects of the industrial structure on GNP, capital and public
and private external debts accumulation. The estimated direct effects indicate that the greater
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the percentage of the labour force employed in agriculture: 1. the lower the GNP level (this
result is statistically significant only for Sub-Saharan Africa), 2. the greater the
accumulation of capital stock, 3. the smaller the accumulation of public and publicly
guaranteed external debt, and 4. the smaller the accumulation of private external debt.

The effect o f the terms o f trade
In all of the three cases, it is found that the higher the value of the terms of trade
index the lower the public and publicly guaranteed external debt. In the case of SubSaharan Africa, it was also found that the private external debt decreases with the terms of
trade. However, in the case of Asia-Pacific, the private external debt increases with the
terms of trade. The ineffectiveness of the increase in the terms of trade in reducing the
private external debt is also evident in the case of Latin America.

The effect o f population and income inequality on the accumulation o f capital stock
As expected, in all the regions the accumulation of capital stock is adversely affected
by the size of the population. The underlying rationale is that, ceteris paribus, the larger the
population the smaller the share of income allocated to savings. The effect of income
inequality on capital accumulation is statistically significant only in the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, where a larger income share accruing to the bottom 40 per cent of households is
associated with a lower level of capital accumulation. This result probably illustrates the
aforementioned positive relationship between income inequality and the propensity to save.
A similar result is obtained in the case of Asia-Pacific, but it was not found to be
statistically significant at the five per cent level. In contrast, an opposite, but statistically
insignificant, result is found in the case of Latin America. In view of the very high degree
of income inequality prevailing in the Latin American countries, the adverse effect of any
further deterioration of income distribution on investment through an increase in social and
political instability will exceed the potential increase in domestic savings.
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The effect o f income inequality on the accumulation o f public external debt
Income inequality might intensify feelings of relative deprivation and hence increase
social and political tension (Sen, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1979). This, in turn, reduces the
government’s commitment and ability to implement drastic measures such as subsidy and
wage cuts and the strict monetary and fiscal policy necessary for restoring efficiency in
resource allocation, curbing the inflation and improving the terms of trade, and
subsequently reducing the country’s external debt burden. However, it is not clear, a
priori, whether income inequality is positively associated with public external debt. In
certain cases, wage and subsidy cuts aimed at reducing the current account deficit might
come at the expense of a further deterioration in the level of income inequality. The
estimation results are quite diversified in this respect. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, a
negative, but statistically insignificant, association between the public external debt and the
income share accruing to the bottom 40 per cent of the households is found, whereas in the
cases of Asia-Pacific and Latin America, a positive (though insignificant in the case of Latin
America) association is found. The statistically insignificant association between public
external debt and income inequality in Latin America can be further explained by the
severity of income inequality in this region. In this case, small improvements in income
distribution are insufficient to alleviate the social and political problems which hamper the
commitment and ability of many of the Latin-American governments to deal with their
external debt problems. In the Asia-Pacific region, where income is substantially more
equally distributed and populist policy is less dominant, it is evident that an improvement in
the public external debt problem occurs at the expense of equity.

The estimation results described above highlight the complexity of the
interrelationships between GNP, public and publicly guaranteed external debt, private
external debt and capital stock. They also indicate the important role of intervening
socioeconomic factors; such as industrial structure, terms of trade, population size and
income inequality; in the determination of the GNP level and the accumulation of capital
and external debts.
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APPENDIX

Reproduction of the Capital Stock’s Time-Series
In order to reproduce the unobserved capital stock’s time-series from the documented
gross investment (I) time-series it is assumed that the motion equation of capital stock is
given by
Kt = It + (l-5)K t_i

(A .l)

where 8 denotes a constant annual depreciation rate.
Of course, if the initial capital stock (K0) were known, the time-series of capital stock
could be easily computed for a predetermined value of 5 by virtue of equation A.I. In the
absence of such information, the following procedure was used to assess Ko. By assuming
further that

Kt = Kogt

(A.2)

and then substituting A.2 into A.l for Kt and Kt.j we obtained

where g is equal to 1 plus the unknown accumulation rate of capital stock. By recalling that
A.3 holds for t as well as for t-1

(A.4)

and hence
It

(A.5)
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Since different values of g are likely to be obtained for any arbitrary choice of two
consecutive values of I, we considered the sample average of the right-hand side of A.5,
which is an unbiased estimator of g:

(A.6 )

We substituted t=l into A.3 to obtain

and computed K 0 for each country with the first (1970) observed value of gross
investment, the estimated value of g from A.6 , and a predetermined value of

8

.

Subsequently, we substituted the computed initial capital stock in A. 1 to find the projected
level of capital stock for the following year; and by subsequent substitutions, the timeseries of capital stock was produced.
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